lightningnetwork/lnd

Escaneado em 5 de jun. de 2026

Risk score/ 100

Risco alto

Resumo

The Lightning Network Daemon (lnd) relies heavily on quantum-vulnerable elliptic curve cryptography (ECDSA, secp256k1, ECDH) across critical components including node authentication, channel establishment, and payment routing. One critical finding involves the use of the obsolete 3DES cipher in TLS configuration. The pervasive use of Bitcoin's secp256k1 curve throughout the codebase poses significant quantum computing risks that could compromise channel funds and node identities when large-scale quantum computers become available.

Crítico

Alto

Médio

Baixo

Principais findings

Crítico3DES / TripleDES

cert/tls.go:14

Evidência

* - Don't use outdated algorithms like SHA-1 and 3DES

Altosecp256k1 (Bitcoin curve)
brontide/fuzz_test.go:14
Evidência
```
"github.com/decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/v4"
```
AltoECDSA
brontide/fuzz_test.go:111
ML-DSA (CRYSTALS-Dilithium) or SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+)
Evidência
```
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(secp256k1.S256(), insecureRNG)
```
Altosecp256k1 (Bitcoin curve)
brontide/fuzz_test.go:116
Evidência
```
return secp256k1.PrivKeyFromBytes(key.D.Bytes())
```
Altosecp256k1 (Bitcoin curve)
brontide/noise.go:26
Evidência
```
protocolName = "Noise_XK_secp256k1_ChaChaPoly_SHA256"
```

+ 14 findings no relatório completo

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